Abstract We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games. A (k, t)-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size k can improve the payoff of one its member by deviating, and no coalition of size t can decrease the payoff of other players. We are interested in pure equilibria, that is, solutions that can be implemented using non-randomized strategies. We suggest a general transformation from multiplayer games to two-player games such that pure equilibria in the first game correspond to winning strategies in the second one. We then devise from this transformation, an algorithm which computes equilibria in regular and mean-payoff games. Robust equilibria in regular games reduce to winning strategies in two-player Muller games and equilibria in mean-payoff games reduce to winning strategies in multidimensional mean-payoff games. In both cases, the obtained algorithms work in polynomial space. PSPACE-hardness of the decision problem already holds for Büchi objectives.
Introduction
Games are intensively used in computer science to model interactions in computerized systems. Two player antagonistic games have been successfully used for the synthesis of reactive systems. In this context, the opponent acts as a hostile environment, and winning strategies provide controllers that ensure correctness of the system under any scenario. In order to model complex systems in which several rational entities interact, multiplayer concurrent games come into the picture. Correctness of the strategies can rely on different solution concepts, which describe formally what is a "good" strategy. In game theory, the fundamental solution concept is Nash equilibrium [14] and other ones have been proposed to refine or relax it, such as subgame perfect equilibrium [17] , iterative admissibility [15] , and robust equilibria [1] . The notion of robust equilibria refines Nash equilibria in two ways:
-a robust equilibrium is resilient, i.e. when a "small" coalition of player change its strategy, it can not improve the payoff of one of its players; -it is immune, i.e. when a "small" coalition changes its strategy, it will not lower the payoff of the non-deviating players.
The size of small coalitions is determined by some bounds written k for resilience and t for immunity. When a strategy is both k-resilient and t-immune, it is called a (k, t)-robust equilibrium. We also generalize this concept to the notion (k, t, r)-robust equilibrium, where if t players are deviating, the others should not have their payoff decrease by more than r.
Example In network design, when many users are interacting, coalitions can easily be formed and resilient strategies are necessary to avoid deviation. It is also likely that some devices are faulty and start behave unexpectedly, hence the need for immune strategies. As an example, consider the problem of medium access control. It was first given a game-theoretic model in [12] . Several users share the access to a wireless channel. These users are selfish and try to maximize the number of packets they transmit. During each slot, they can choose to either transmit or wait for the next slot. If too many users are emitting in the same slot, then they all fail to send data. However Nash equilibria can present two weaknesses:
-there is no guarantee when two (or more) users deviate together; -when a deviation occurs, the strategies of the equilibrium can punish the deviating user without any regard for payoffs of the others. This can result in a situation where, because of a faulty device, nobody can emit.
By comparison, finding resilient equilibria with k greater than 1, ensures that players have no interest in forming coalitions (up to size k), and finding immune equilibria with t greater than 0 ensures that other players will not suffer from some agents (up to t) behaving differently from what was expected.
Contribution In this paper, we study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games. In Section 3, we describe a generic transformation from multiplayer games to two-player games. The resulting two-player game is called the deviator game. We show that equilibria in the original game correspond to winning strategies in the second one. In Section 4, we show that for games with regular preferences, the game obtained by the transformation can be expressed as a two-player Muller game. Making use of this transformation, we present an algorithm to find equilibria in regular games. We show that this algorithm works in polynomial space for Muller objectives. This is matched by a PSPACE-hardness lower bound for Büchi objectives. In Section 5, we study quantitative games with mean-payoff objectives. We show that the game obtained by our transformation is equivalent to a multidimensional mean-payoff game and provide a polynomial space algorithm.
Related works Other solution concepts have been studied on game on graph, in particular Nash equilibrium [19, 20, 4] , subgame perfect equilibria [18, 6] , regret minimization [11] , secure equilibria [8] . Note that in this paper we only consider pure strategies: in the general case of randomized strategies, existence of a Nash equilibrium is undecidable [20] . The central construction of the deviator game, is inspired by the suspect game of [4] , which was developed for Nash equilibria. However, the analysis of quantitative games such as mean-payoff games is more elaborate than for Nash equilibria (see [20] ). To solve quantitative games, we rely on the analysis of multidimensional mean-payoff games [21, 5] . Note that the concept of robust equilibria for games with LTL objectives is expressible in logics such as strategy logic [9] or ATL * [2] . However, deciding satisfiability in these logic is difficult: it is 2EXPTIME-complete for ATL * and undecidable for strategy logic in general (2EXPTIME-complete fragments exist [13] ). Moreover, these logics cannot express equilibria in games with quantitative games such as mean-payoff. Nash equilibria correspond to the special case of (1, 0)-robust equilibria. Secure equilibria [8] , do not exactly correspond to a class of robust equilibria, however we can note that (1, 1)-robust =⇒ secure =⇒ (1, 0)-robust. Although we do not directly solve the problem of finding secure equilibria in this paper, the techniques presented here could be adapted.
Definitions

Concurrent game structures
We study concurrent game structures (CGS) as defined in [2] .
Definition 1 (Concurrent game structure). A concurrent game structure G is a tuple Stat, s 0 , Agt, Act, Mov, Tab , where:
-Stat is a finite set of states and s 0 ∈ Stat is the initial state; -Agt is a finite set of players; -Act is a finite set of actions; a tuple (m A ) A∈Agt containing one action for each player is called a move; -Mov : Stat × Agt → P(Act) \ {∅} indicates the actions available to a given player in a given state 1 ; if an action m belongs to Mov(s, A) it is said legal in state s for player A; a move (m A ) A∈Agt is said legal in state s if for each A ∈ Agt, m A is legal in s for A; -Tab : Stat × Act Agt → Stat is the transition function, it associates with a given state and a given move, the resulting state; it is only defined for pairs (s, (m A ) A∈Agt ) where (m A ) A∈Agt is legal in s.
In a CGS G, whenever we arrive at a state s, the players simultaneously select an action, which results in a move m Agt ; the next state of the game is then Tab(s, m Agt ). This process starts from s 0 and is repeated ad infinitum to form an infinite sequence of states. An example of a CGS is given in Figure ? ?.
Definition 2 (History and plays).
A history of the game G is a finite sequence of states and moves ending with a state, i.e. an element of (Stat·Act Agt ) * · Stat. We write h i the i-th state of h, starting from 0, and m h i its i-th move, thus
The length |h| of such a history is n + 1. We write last(h) the last state of h, i.e. h |h|−1 . A play ρ is an infinite sequence of states and moves, i.e. an element of (Stat · Act Agt ) ω . We write ρ ≤n for the prefix of ρ of length n + 1, i.e. ρ 0 · m
Definition 3 (Strategies). Let G be a CGS, and A ∈ Agt. A strategy for player A maps histories to available actions. Formally, a strategy is a function A) . A coalition C ⊆ Agt is a set of players, its size is written |C|. A strategy σ C for a coalition C ⊆ Agt is a tuple of strategies, one for each player in C. We write σ C = (σ A ) A∈C for such a strategy. A strategy profile is a strategy for Agt. We will write (σ −C , σ Definition 4 (Outcomes). Let G be a CGS, C a coalition, and σ C a strategy for C. A play ρ is compatible with the strategy σ C if, for all k < |ρ| − 1, there exists a move (m A ) A∈Agt s.t. m A = σ A (ρ ≤k ) for all A ∈ C, and Tab(ρ =k , (m A ) A∈Agt ) = ρ =k+1 . We write Out G (s, σ C ) for the set of paths in G that are compatible with strategy σ C of C and have initial state s, these paths are called outcomes of σ C from s. We simply write Out G (σ C ) when s = s 0 . Note that when the coalition C is composed of all the players the outcome is unique.
Preferences
In this work, we will give techniques to study games with a general notion of preferences, and deeper analyze the algorithmic aspects for Muller objectives and mean payoff preferences. In general, we will assume that preferences of each player are given by payoff functions that assign a real value to each run.
Definition 5.
A concurrent game is a CGS equipped with payoff functions for each player. Formally, a concurrent game is a tuple G, (payoff A ) A∈Agt , where G is a concurrent game structure and for each A ∈ Agt, payoff A : (Stat · Act Agt ) ω → R. It is called the payoff of player A. When payoff A (ρ) < payoff A (ρ ′ ), we say that A prefers ρ ′ over ρ. The tuple u ∈ R Agt such that u A = payoff A (ρ) for each player A ∈ Agt is called the payoff vector of ρ.
In the case of purely qualitative preferences, payoff A can be given by a set Ω A , so that payoff(ρ) = 1 if ρ ′ ∈ Ω A and 0 otherwise. In that case Ω A is called an objective. A play ρ ∈ Ω A is said winning for A, and a play ρ ∈ Ω A is said losing for A. An example of purely qualitative preference is that of Muller objectives that we now define.
Definition 6 (Muller objectives).
We denote the set of states occurring infinitely often in a play ρ by Inf(ρ) = {s ∈ Stat|∀j ∈ N. ∃i > j, ρ i = s}. A Muller objective is given by F ⊆ P(Stat). It requires that the set of states seen infinitely often equals one of F . Formally,
Remark 1. Representing the set F explicitly can be costly, as its size can be exponential in the number of states in the game. Instead, we will assume that the objective are represented by Boolean circuits, which can be exponentially more succinct [10] . A P is a Boolean circuits with |Stat| inputs defines an objective Ω P : it is the set of run ρ for which the circuit P evaluates Inf(ρ).
We now present mean payoffs which are given by the long term average of the weights.
Definition 7.
A mean payoff is given by a weight function w : Stat → Z which assigns to each state an integer weight. The payoff associated to a run is: MP w (ρ) = lim inf n→∞ 1 n 0≤k≤n w(ρ k ).
Equilibria notions
In this section, we describe the different solution concepts we will study. Solution concepts are formal descriptions of "good" strategy profiles. The most famous of them is Nash equilibrium [14] , in which no player can improve the outcome for her preference relation, by only changing her strategy. This notion can be generalized to consider coalitions of players, it is then called a resilient strategy profile. Nash equilibria correspond to the special case of 1-resilient strategy profiles.
Resilience [3] Given a coalition C, a strategy profile σ Agt is C-resilient if for all player A in C, A cannot improve her payoff even if all players in C change their strategies, i.e. σ Agt is said C-resilient when:
Given an integer k, we say that a strategy profile is k-resilient if it is C-resilient for every coalition C of size k.
Immunity [1]
To ensure that players not deviating are not too much affected by deviation, we consider immune strategies. A strategy profile σ Agt is (C, r)-immune if all players not in C, are not worse off by more than r if players in C deviates, i.e. when:
Given an integer t, a strategy profile is said (t, r)-immune if it is (C, r)-immune for every coalition C of size t. Note that t-immunity as defined in [1] corresponds to (t, 0)-immunity.
Robust Equilibrium [1]
Combining resilience and immunity, gives the notion of robust equilibrium. A strategy profile is a (k, t, r)-robust equilibrium if it is both k-resilient and (t, r)-immune.
We are interested in the following decision problems and in computing the corresponding equilibria.
A logic for equilibria
In order to generalize these concepts of equilibria, we propose a logic for describing equilibria notions. The syntax of this logic is given by the following grammar:
where C ⊆ Agt represents a coalition of players, i ∈ Agt, ⊲⊳∈ {<, ≤, =, ≥, >} and q ∈ Q. We call such a formula φ is an equilibrium formula.
The intuitive meaning of the [C] is that we quantify over all possible strategies of C. The precise semantics of this logic is that the strategy profile (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) satisfies:
As we will see this logic is expressive enough for the equilibria notions we defined and we will see efficient algorithms for checking its satisfiability. Example 1. We give a example of a simple three-player turn-based game in Figure 1. In this game, there is no 2-resilient strategy profile. If A 1 wins (state s 3 ) then A 2 and A 3 can form a coalition so that A 2 wins by both playing action b in state s 1 . Similarly, if A 2 or A 3 wins then the two others can form a coalition so that A 1 wins. However, there is a (1, 1)-robust equilibrium. Consider the strategy for A 1 that always plays a, and the one for A 2 and A 3 that plays a in s 1 . The outcome of this strategy profile ends in s 3 with payoff (1, 0, 0). Players A 2 cannot change her strategy alone in order to win, and A 3 does not either, so this is a Nash equilibrium (i.e. 1-resilient). If the strategy of A 1 changes, it is harmless for other players, since they were already losing. If the strategy of A 2 changes, then because of A 3 the run still ends up in s 3 . The situation is similar when the strategy of A 3 changes. Therefore this strategy is also 1-immune.
Deviator Game
In order to obtain simple algorithms for the robustness problem, we use a correspondence with winning strategies. The concept of winning strategy has been well studied in computer science and we can make use of existing algorithms. We present the deviator game, which is a transformation of multiplayer game into a turn-based zero-sum game, such that there are strong links between robust equilibria in the first one and winning strategies in the second one. This is inspired by the suspect game construction [4] .
A three player concurrent game with mean-payoff preferences. The set of states is Stat = {s0, s1, s2, s3, s3}, the set of players is Agt = {A1, A2, A3} and the set of actions is Act = {a, b}. Labels above an edge indicates the moves which trigger them. For instance, in state s0, a and b are legal for A1, and only a is legal for the other players, then Tab(s0, (a, a, a)) = s1 and Tab(s0, (b, a, a)) = s2. Labels inside a state (such as (0, 0, 1)) denote the payoff for each player. For instance A1 prefers (1, 0, 0) which has payoff 1 for him, over (0, 1, 0) which has payoff 0.
Deviators
The basic notion we use to solve the robustness problem is that of deviators. It identifies players that cause the current deviation from the expected outcome.
We write this set of deviators:
We extend the definition to histories and strategies by taking the union of deviator sets, formally Dev(h, σ Agt ) = 0≤i<|h| Dev(m h i , σ Agt (h ≤i )). It naturally extends to plays: if ρ is a play, then Dev(ρ, σ Agt ) = i∈N Dev(m ρ i , σ Agt (ρ ≤i )). Intuitively, given an play ρ and a strategy profile σ Agt , deviators represent the players that need to change their strategies from σ Agt in order to obtain the play ρ. This intuition is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a play ρ, a coalition C contains Dev(ρ, σ Agt ) if, and only if, there exists σ
Proof. ⇒ Let ρ be a play, σ Agt a strategy profile, and C a coalition which contains Dev(ρ, σ Agt ). We define σ ′ C to be such that for all i, σ
⇐ Let σ Agt be a strategy profile, σ ′ C a strategy for coalition C, and ρ ∈ Out G (ρ 0 , σ −C , σ ′ C ). We have for all index i that m
Deviator Arena
We now use the notion of deviators to draw a link between multiplayer games and a two-player game structure that we will use to solve the robustness problem. Given a concurrent game structure G, we define the deviator arena D(G) between two players called Eve and Adam. Intuitively Eve needs to play according to an equilibrium, while Adam tries to find a deviation of a coalition which will profit one of its player or harm one of the others. We define projections π Stat , π Dev and π Act from Stat ′ to Stat, from Stat ′ to 2
Agt and from Act Agt × Act Agt to Act Agt respectively. This is given by
We extend these projections to plays in a natural way, letting
For any play ρ, and any index i, π Dev (ρ i ) ⊆ π Dev (ρ i+1 ). Therefore π Dev (ρ) seen as a sequence of sets of coalitions is increasing and bounded by Agt, its limit δ(ρ) = ∪ i∈N π Dev (ρ i ) is well defined. To a strategy profile σ Agt in G, we can naturally associate a strategy π(
The following proposition shows the link between strategies of the original game and associated strategies of the deviator game. Proposition 1. Let G be a game and σ Agt be a strategy profile and σ ∃ = π(σ Agt ) the associated strategy in the deviator game.
Proof (Proof of (1)). We prove that for all i, Dev(π Stat (ρ) ≤i , σ Agt ) = π Dev (ρ ≤i ), which implies the property. The property holds for i = 0, since initially both sets are empty. Assume now that it holds for i ≥ 0.
Which concludes the induction.
Proof (Proof of (2)). The property is shown by induction. It holds for the initial state. Assume it is true until index i, then
This shows that ρ ′ is an outcome of σ ∃ .
Objectives of the deviator game
We now show how to transform equilibria notions into objectives of the deviator game. These objectives are defined so that winning strategies correspond to solution for these equilibria notions. Let φ be an equilibrium formula, we define indectively the associated objective τ (φ):
As an illustration of the expressiveness of this fragment considered, it is easy to specify secure equilibria. Following the definition of [8] , the strategy profile (σ A1 , σ A2 ) is a secure equilibria in G when it is a Nash equilibrium and:
There is a secure equilibria with payoff r 1 , r 2 if the following equilibrium formula is satisfiable:
We then have the following property:
Proof. ⇒ Let ρ be an outcome of σ ∃ = π(σ Agt ). By Prop. 1, we have that Dev(π Stat (ρ), σ Agt ) = δ(ρ). The objective τ (φ) is of the form i∈ 1,n {ρ | δ(ρ) ⊆ C i =⇒ τ (ψ i )} where φ is the conjunction of the formulas
). Therefore it satisfies ψ i where we replace all payoff Aj ⊲⊳ r j by payoff Aj (π Stat (ρ ′ )) ⊲⊳ r j , which gives that ρ ′ satisfies τ (φ i ). This holds for all i ∈ 1, n and all outcome of σ ∃ , thus σ ∃ is a winning strategy for τ (ψ).
⇐ Assume σ ∃ = π(σ Agt ) is a winning strategy in D(G) for τ (φ). The equilibrium formula φ is the conjunction of formulas of the form [C i ]ψ i for i ∈ 1, n . Let i ∈ 1, n , σ ′ Ci be strategy of C i and ρ the outcome of (σ
. This is true for all i, thus σ Agt satisfies φ.
Lemma 2. Let G be a concurrent game and σ Agt a strategy profile in G. The strategy profile σ Agt satisfies φ if, and only if, strategy π(σ Agt ) is winning in D(G) for objective τ (φ).
We now use the transformation for the equilibria notions we defined. For instance, concerning resilience, this gives a
-The strategy profile σ Agt is (t, r)-immune if, and only if, strategy π(σ Agt ) is winning for the immunity objective I(t, r, Out(σ Agt )) defined by: Where the of Eve is:
-The strategy profile σ Agt is a (k, t, r)-robust profile in G if, and only if, π(σ Agt ) is winning for the robustness objective:
R(k, t, r, Out(σ Agt )) = Re(k, Out(σ Agt )) ∩ I(t, r, Out(σ Agt )).
Proof of Thm. 1
Lemma 3. Let G be a concurrent game and σ Agt a strategy profile in G. The strategy profile σ Agt is k-resilient if, and only if, strategy π(σ Agt ) is winning in D(G) for objective Re(k, Out(σ Agt )). Where Re is defined by:
Proof. Let ρ be the outcome of σ Agt , and for each player A, q A = payoff A (ρ), resilience of σ Agt can by expressed by the formula:
By Lem. 2, σ Agt is then resilient if, and only if, π(σ Agt ) is winning for τ (φ). We now show that τ (φ) is equivalent to Re(k, ρ).
each player B and C be a coalition such that |C| ≤ k. We show that ρ ′ satisfies
Lemma 4. The strategy profile σ Agt is (t, r)-immune if, and only if, strategy π(σ Agt ) is winning for objective I(t, r, Out(σ Agt )). Where, given t, r and a path ρ, the immunity objective of Eve is:
Proof. Let ρ be the outcome of σ Agt , and for each player A, q A = payoff A (ρ), (t, r)-immunity of σ Agt can by expressed by the formula:
By Lem. 2, σ Agt is then resilient if, and only if, π(σ Agt ) is winning for τ (φ). We now show that τ (φ) is equivalent to I(t, r, ρ).
′ satisfies the immunity objective I(t, r, Out(σ Agt )).
each player B, and C be a coalition such that |C| ≤ t. We show that
Lemma 5. The strategy profile σ Agt is a (k, t, r)-robust profile in G if, and only if, the associated strategy of Eve is winning for the objective R(k, t, r, Out(σ Agt )) = Re(k, Out(σ Agt )) ∩ I(t, r, Out(σ Agt )).
Proof. This is a simple consequence of Lem. 3 and Lem. 4. Let σ Agt be a (k, t)-robust strategy profile. It is k-resilient, so π(σ Agt ) is winning the resilience objective. It is also t-immune, so π(σ Agt ) is winning the immunity objective. Therefore σ Agt wins the robustness objective.
In the other direction, assume π(σ Agt ) wins the robustness objective. Then σ Agt wins both the k-resilience objective and the t-immunity objective. Using lemmas 3 and 4, σ Agt is k-resilient and t-immune. Therefore, σ Agt is (k, t)-robust.
Algorithm for Muller objectives
In this section, we use the previous construction to devise an algorithm for robust equilibria in games with Muller objectives. Note that for qualitative objective the value of r is of little importance and we talk about (k, t)-robust equilibria for (k, t, 0)-robust equilibria. The algorithm we describe works in polynomial space. This is because once a payoff is fixed, staying above this payoff can be reduced to a Muller objective whose description in terms of circuits is succinct. The complexity of the algorithm is matched by a PSPACE lower bound for resilience in Büchi games, which is one of the simplest regular preferences.
Reduction to Muller objective To describe the robustness objective R(k, t, ρ), we need to characterize paths whose payoff is greater of equal to ρ and paths whose payoff is smaller or equal to ρ. We show that this can be done with succinct Muller conditions. Note that we assume the Muller conditions to be given by Boolean circuits in order to keep succinctness. The winner of a game with such conditions can be decided in PSPACE [10] . Proof. This is because in the qualitative case, R(k, t, v) is a Boolean combination of the objectives of the players and the size of the deviator set. The fact that the number of deviators is not greater than k or t can be checked by a Boolean circuit of polynomial size. Since Muller condition described by Boolean circuit are easy to combine by Boolean operations by just adding one gate, the global size of the circuit is polynomial.
Computation of the strategies This reduction to Muller games allows to define a naive algorithm that would construct the deviator game D and compute winning strategies of the Muller game defined by D if there exists one. Once such a winning strategy σ ∃ has been constructed, it is easy to construct a strategy profile that constitutes a robust equilibria in the original game by encoding in the memory of the strategy of each player the current state of the D component. Such a procedure would be in doubly exponential time since a Muller games are known to be PSPACE-complete [10] and the game D is of exponential size with respect to the number of players. However we will see in the following that we can decide in polynomial space whether such a strategy profile exists by exploiting the particular structure of the deviator game.
Fixed coalition Although the deviator game may be of exponential size, it presents a particular structure, that we will use to obtain a polynomial space algorithm. As the set of deviators only increases during any run, the game can be seen as the product of the original game with a directed acyclic graph (DAG). This DAG is of exponential size but polynomial degree and depth. We take advantage of this structure by remembering which states are winning only if they are in a component corresponding to a node of the DAG immediately below the current one. We now present the details of the construction. For a fixed set of deviator D, the possible successors of the component Stat × D are the states in: Muller objectives the fixed coalition game When players have Muller objectives, the winning condition we defined can still be expressed as a Muller objective. We write
Let F Re and F I be given by:
The objective of Eve in M(D, ρ) is given by the Muller condition: F Succ ∪ (F Re ∩ F I ). The next lemma shows that this transformation preserves winning states. compute Succ(D);
Global algorithm In order to define a PSPACE algorithm we first need to restrict our search to paths of a particular form.
Lemma 7. Let G be a concurrent game with Muller objectives. If there is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium, then there is one with outcome of the form π · τ ω with |π| ≤ |Stat| 2 and |τ | ≤ |Stat| 2 .
The idea of the proof is similar to the one used for Nash equilibria [4] .
Proof. Let σ Agt be a (k, t)-robust equilibrium, and ρ be its outcome from s. We define a new strategy profile σ ′ Agt , whose outcome from s is ultimately periodic, and then show that σ ′ Agt is (k, t)-robust from s. To begin with, we inductively construct a history π = π 0 π 1 . . . π n that is not too long and visits precisely those states that are visited by ρ.
The initial state is π 0 = ρ 0 = s. Then we assume we have constructed π ≤k = π 0 . . . π k which visits exactly the same states as ρ ≤k ′ for some k ′ . If all the states of ρ have been visited in π ≤k then the construction is over. Otherwise there is an index i such that ρ i does not appear in π ≤k . We therefore define our next target as the smallest such i: we let t(π ≤k ) = min{i | ∀j ≤ k. π j = ρ i }.
We then look at the occurrence of the current state π k that is the closest to the target in ρ: we let c(π ≤k ) = max{i < t(π ≤k ) | π k = ρ i }.
Then we emulate what happens at that position by choosing π i+1 = ρ c(π ≤i )+1 . Then π i+1 is either the target, or a state that has already been seen before in π ≤k , in which case the resulting π ≤k+1 visits exactly the same states as ρ ≤c(π ≤i )+1 . At each step, either the number of remaining targets strictly decreases, or the number of remaining targets is constant but the distance to the next target strictly decreases. Therefore the construction terminates. Moreover, notice that between two targets we do not visit the same state twice, and we visit only states that have already been visited, plus the target. As the number of targets is bounded by |Stat|, we get that the length of the path π constructed thus far is bounded by 1 + |Stat| · (|Stat| − 1)/2.
Using similar ideas, we now inductively construct τ = τ 0 τ 1 . . . τ m , which visits precisely those states which are seen infinitely often along ρ, and which is not too long. Let l be the least index after which the states visited by ρ are visited infinitely often, i.e. l = min{i ∈ N | ∀j ≥ i. ρ j ∈ Inf(ρ)}. The run ρ ≥l is such that its set of visited states and its set of states visited infinitely often coincide. We therefore define τ in the same way we have defined π above, but for play ρ ≥l . As a by-product, we also get c(τ ≤k ), for k < m.
We now need to glue π and τ together, and to ensure that τ can be glued to itself, so that π · τ ω is a real run. We therefore need to link the last state of π with the first state of τ (and similarly the last state of τ with its first state). This possibly requires appending some more states to π and τ : we fix the target of π and τ to be τ 0 , and apply the same construction as previously. The total length of the resulting paths π and τ is bounded by 1 + (|Stat| − 1) · (|Stat| + 2)/2 which less than |Stat| 2 .
We let ρ ′ = π ·τ ω , and abusively write c(ρ ′ ≤k ) for c(π ≤k ) if k ≤ |π| and c(τ ≤k ′ ) with k ′ = (k−1−|π|) mod |τ | otherwise. We now define our new strategy profile, having ρ ′ as outcome from s. Given a history h:
-if h followed the expected path, i.e. , h = ρ ′ ≤k for some k, we mimic the strategy at c(h): σ ′ Agt (h) = σ Agt (ρ c(h) ). This way, ρ ′ is the outcome of σ ′ Agt from s. -otherwise we take the longest prefix h ≤k that is a prefix of ρ ′ , and define σ
We now show that σ ′ Agt is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium. Assume that a coalition C of size k (rep. size t) changes its strategy while playing according to σ ′ Agt : either the resulting outcome does not deviate from π · τ ω , in which case the payoff of the players is not changed; or it deviates at some point, and from that point on, σ ′ Agt follows the same strategies as in σ Agt . Assume that the resulting outcome is an improvement over ρ ′ for one player in C (resp. not as good as ρ ′ for one player in Agt \ C). The suffix of the play after the deviation is the suffix of a play of σ Agt after a deviation by the same coalition. By construction, both plays have the same visited and infinitely-visited sets. Hence we have found an advantageous deviation from σ Agt for a player in C (resp. disadvantageous for a player in Agt \ C), contradicting that σ Agt is k-resilient (resp. t-immune).
We now use Algorithm 1 and the result of Thm. 1 to devise an algorithm for the robustness problem.
Theorem 2. The robustness problem is PSPACE-complete for Muller games.
Proof (Sketch). The algorithm proceeds by trying all path ρ = π · τ ω where |τ | and |π| bounded by |Stat| 2 , computing which states are winning in the deviator game for objective R(k, t, ρ), and then checking that ρ stays in these winning states. Correctness of this algorithm holds thanks to Thm. 1 and Lem. 7. The space needed by the algorithm is polynomial in the size of the input. This is because the sizes of the lasso paths we try are polynomial (Lem. 7), and Algorithm 1 that we use to compute winning states, works in polynomial space. Prop. 2 ensures that we call it on a Muller game of polynomial size. Hardness of the problem already holds for turn-based Büchi games (proof in the Appendix). We now give more details concerning the proof of Thm. 2.
Space usage
The space usage depends on the type of preferences, since the Muller game M(D) is possibly exponential. However in the case of Muller objectives, we can show that the algorithm works in polynomial space. Indeed, the size of the stack of recursive calls is bounded by the number of players, as the set of deviators can only be increasing. The only information we remember about this computation is whether each state of Succ(D) is winning, this only requires polynomial space.
Computing the winner of a Muller game [10] and all the other operations inside the functions are done in polynomial space. Hence the procedure we describe is executed in polynomial space.
Correctness
Lemma 8. The algorithm return true if, and only if, there is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium.
Proof. ⇒ Assume the algorithm return true, then let ρ be such that ρ stays in the winning region. We define a strategy σ ∃ of D(G) which follows ρ when possible and revert to a winning strategy otherwise. Formally:
, where σ hi ∃ is a winning strategy for Eve. Such a strategy exists because ρ stays in the winning region.
There is an outcome of σ ∃ whose projection is ρ and any outcome whose projection is different from ρ is winning for Eve. By definition of the objective R(k, t, ρ), the outcome whose projection is ρ is also winning. By Theorem 1, the strategy σ Agt whose projection is σ ∃ is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium.
⇐ In the other direction, assume there is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium. By Lem. 7, there is one σ Agt whose outcome ρ is of the form π · τ ω with |π| and |τ | bounded by |Stat| 2 . This ensures that ρ will be considered at some point in the forall loop. By Theorem 1, the strategy of Eve associated to σ Agt is a winning strategy, therefore it has to be winning from all states of ρ, which shows that ρ stays in the winning region. Hence the algorithm returns true.
Lemma 9 (space usage). The space needed by the algorithm is polynomial in the size of the input.
Proof. This is because the size of the lasso paths we have to try is polynomial, so it is possible to enumerate all of them using polynomial space. Then Algorithm 1 that we use to compute winning states, works in PSPACE.
Hardness
We show that the problem is PSPACE-hard, even in the restricted case of resilience for Büchi objectives. Proof. We encode QSAT formulae with n variable into a game with 2 · n + 2 players, such that the formula is valid if, and only if, there is n-resilient equilibria.
We can assume that we are given a formula of the form φ = ∀x 1 .∃x 2 . ∀x 3 · ∃x n . C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k , where each C k is of the form ℓ 1,k ∨ ℓ 2,k ∨ ℓ 3,k and each ℓ j,k is a literral (i.e. x m or ¬x m for some m). We define the game G φ as illustrated by an example in Figure 3 . It has a player A m for each positive literral x m , and a player B m for each negative literral ¬x m . We add two extra players Eve and Adam. Eve is making choices for the existential quantification and Adam for the universal ones. When they chose a litteral, the corresponding player can either go to a sink state ⊥ or continue the game to the next quantification. Once a litteral has been chosen for all the variables, Eve needs to chose a litteral for each clause.
The objective for Eve and the litteral players is to reach ⊥. The objective for Adam is to reach ⊤. We ask whether there is a (n + 1)-resilient equilibrium.
If the outcome is going to the state winning for Adam, it is possible for a A i to change its strategy and go to ⊥, thus improving its payoff. Therefore a (n + 1)-resilient equilibrium is necessarly losing for Adam and winning for all the others.
To a history h = Adam 1 ·X 1 ·Eve 2 ·X 2 ·Adam 3 · · · Eve m ·X m with X i ∈ {A i , B i }, we associate a valuation v h , such that v h (x i ) = true if X i = B i and v h (x i ) = false if X i = A i .
Validity =⇒ equilibrium. Assume that φ is valid, we will show that there is a (n + 1)-resilient equilibrium. We define a strategy of Eve such that if v h makes ∃x m . ∀x m+1 · · · ∃x n . C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k valid, then σ ∃ (h) = X m such that v h·Xm makes ∀x m+1 · · · ∃x n . C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k valid. As φ is valid, we know that for all outcome h of σ ∃ of the form Adam 1 · X 1 · · · Eve k · X k , v h makes C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k valid. Then from X m , Eve can choose for each close a state Y that is different from all X 1 . . . X m . We also fix the strategy of all players A i and B i and Adam to go to the state ⊥. This defines a strategy profile that we will write σ Agt .
Consider a strategy profile σ Equilibrium =⇒ validity. Assume that σ ∃ is part of a (n+1)-resilient equilibrium, we will show that φ is valid. Given a partial valuation v m : {x 1 , . . . , x m } → {true, false}, we define the function f (v m ) such that:
We will show that every valuation v, such that v(x 2k ) = f (v |2k−1 ), makes the formula C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k valid, which shows that the formula φ is valid.
For all such valuation v, we can define strategies of Adam and players X i such that X i = A i if v(x i ) = false and X i = B i otherwise, such that keeping all other strategies similar to σ Agt , the state Eve m is reached. Then, if we see a state belonging to one of the X i , we can make the strategy go to the ⊤ state. Since the profile is (n + 1)-resilient, this is impossible. Which shows that σ Eve choses for each clause a litteral such that v(ℓ) = true. Therefore v makes the formula C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k valid. The dashed edges represent the strategies in the equilibrium of the players other than Eve.
Mean-payoff preferences
We now turn our attention to mean-payoff games. We first show that the deviator game reduces the robustness problem to a winning strategy problem in multidimensional mean-payoff games. Similarly to Muller objectives, the algorithm looks for a path which stays in the winning region corresponding to its payoff. This is done by requests to the polyhedron value problem of [5] .
Reduction to multidimensional mean-payoff objectives Our goal is to describe in a known formalism the objectives of Eve in the deviator game. For that we define multidimensional mean-payoff objectives [21, 5] and then show how to encode the objective of Eve as a multidimensional mean-payoff objective.
Definition 8. Given a game G, two weight functions w, w : Stat → R d , we say that Eve can ensure threshold (u, u ′ ) ∈ R d × R d if she has a strategy σ ∃ such that all outcome ρ of σ ∃ is such that for all i ∈ 1, d , MP wi (ρ) ≥ u i and for all j ∈ 1, d , MP wi (ρ) ≥ u ′ i , where MP w (ρ) = lim sup n→∞ 1 n 0≤k≤n w(ρ k ). That is, for all dimension i, the limit inferior of the average of w i is greater than u i and the limit superior of w i is greater than u ′ i .
For us the number of dimension d will be equal to |Agt|, we then number players so that Agt = {A 1 , . . . , A d }. Let W = max{|w Ai (s)| | A i ∈ Agt, s ∈ Stat} be the maximum constant occurring in the game, notice that for all player A i and play ρ, −W − 1 < w Ai (ρ) ≤ W . We fix parameters k, t and define two weight functions v, v : Stat → Z n given by:
